IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

HONG KONG YU'EN E-COMMERCE CO. LIMITED, Plaintiff, v. THE INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED IN SCHEDULE "A" HERETO, Defendants.	**Case No. 1:24-cv-12483-EEB-MDW** **Honorable Judge Elaine E. Bucklo** **Magistrate M. David Weisman**

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT FUNLINGO'S MOTION TO DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND FOR LEAVETO CONDUCT EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

In the brief time that Defendant, Funlingo, and its counsel, Zheng Gao, Esq., have been involved in this litigation (i.e., less than two months since appearing on February 13, 2025), they have transparently evinced their overall litigation strategy, which is to enthusiastically deploy every method of gamesmanship imaginable, done in utter bad faith and with intentional disregard for any ramifications – behavior which is certain to continue throughout the pendency of this matter absent intervention by this Honorable Court. Such misconduct has been unequivocally rebuked by legal tribunals across the country and is entombed in the immeasurable wealth of legal authority which remains controlling law to date. The inherent principles and mandates of this unshakable cornerstone of our legal justice system have been engrained upon the minds of all competent attorneys. In order to practice law before this Honorable Court in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, all counsel of record must honor this legal precedent by ensuring they and their clients comport themselves accordingly, in fairness and good faith.

Because Defendant has filed a completely meritless and defective motion, which clearly demonstrates an intentional and deliberate disregard for applicable duties of good faith and the legal precedent of this jurisdiction, Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court: (1) summarily deny Defendant's Motion; (2) order sanctions, including attorney fees and costs, and any other sanctions deemed appropriate, as against both the Defendant and Attorney Gao individually; (3) reprimand Defendant and Attorney Gao on the record and reserve the right to sua sponte sanction and recurrences of such conduct going forward; (4) order any other form of relief which this Court deems just and suited to prevent future abuse of the judicial process and prejudice to Plaintiff.

I. ARGUMENT

Defendant's Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction and for Leave to Conduct Expedited Discovery is procedurally and substantively defective, devoid of any pertinent facts or legal precedent, sets forth an overwhelming amount of extraneous and irrelevant material, and includes countless self-serving statements and contentions by counsel which have absolutely zero bearing on the determination of any issues which are theoretically related to the relief requested therein. Accordingly, because this motion is defective and improper in every single aspect, it must be denied. Additionally, Plaintiff hereby seeks relief which includes, at minimum, summary denial of the motion and all requests made therein, sanctions of Defendant and its counsel for its egregious bad faith conduct and gamesmanship, including intentional and repeated misrepresentations of facts, evidence, law, and court orders previously entered in the case; setting forth knowingly inaccurate legal arguments and precedent which is wholly inapplicable or made in bad faith; refusing to amend or withdraw bad faith legal motion practice after learning facts dispositive of same; denying knowledge of dispositive facts which adversely impact Defendant and its motion; setting forth wholly extraneous and irrelevant statements and contentions without proper foundation and with no rational or logical explanation or connection to the present briefing; wholly misrepresenting and attacking the character of undersigned counsel in self-serving commentary and contentions regarding professional conduct; coercing a Zoom conference with undersigned counsel by repeatedly harassing communications transmitted via email including a written threat of a motion for sanctions against undersigned counsel personally – made knowingly without any legal basis or foundation or rationale; and during that resulting conference knowingly and intentionally manipulating evidence in the case in an effort to fraudulently coerce a dismissal of the Defendant by stipulation, which was discovered and confronted in writing by undersigned counsel and subsequently ignored by Mr. Gao, and is now completely and conveniently omitted from the briefing set forth. This conduct as a whole has proven to be egregious, persistent, foundationless, exhausting, and costly to Plaintiff, and without intervention, it will absolutely continue to the detriment of this Court and all involved.

A. Defendant's Motion for Dissolution of the Preliminary Injunction Must be Denied.

1. Defendant's Motion is Procedurally Defective.

Defendant's motion seeks by its title to dissolve the preliminary injunction previously granted in this case and to conduct expedited discovery. However, Defendant fails to set forth the legal basis or standards for either request or in any general manner relating to those topics of law. Defendant further fails to state any foundation or standard upon which he premises the purported ability to bring said motion, resulting in a document which is entirely defective and intentionally frustrates Plaintiff's ability to present a logical argument in opposition. As such, Defendant's motion procedurally fails to set the stage for any relief it purportedly seeks and should be denied on those grounds. The Court is not required to guess as to the party's requests for relief or to make or set forth any arguments for that party to aid or explain its positions or which the party failed to set forth itself.

Additionally, and as a result of the above, all extraneous, irrelevant, self-serving commentary and wholly illogical commentary – including the conversations and communications between counsel – have absolutely zero bearing on the motion. Because the legal basis for setting those comments forth is absent in its entirety, the Court must strike and disregard any such comments from consideration for any purpose. The egregiously intentional lies set forth therein should be considered by this Court for purposes of sanctions, however, and those are outlined herein in Section 2 for the Court's review.

Most demonstrably, there is no issue presented which is ripe for review. Ripeness is defined as a dispute which has evolved to the point that a determination is necessary or appropriate, as that determination may grant a form of relief to either party which decides or resolves a request or need of that party. Here, Defendant fails to set forth a single iota of data, reasoning, or rationale for wanting the preliminary injunction dissolved – there is no harm or injury threatened or actually incurred and there is thus nothing to redress by way of this motion. Rather, Plaintiff ineffectually attacks the foundation of the evidence which the Court used as a basis in granting the TRO in this matter, and subsequent preliminary injunction, and demands the Court simply change its mind. Because that is not appropriate or a ripe issue for review, the motion should be denied outright for failure to set forth a discernable and ripe issue for decision.

The motion likewise fails procedurally for mootness, as the arguments set forth are set upon two main contentions (which are addressed in the next section of this brief in greater detail). Plaintiff complains that this injunction must be dissolved because (1) there is no infringement evidence, (2) that evidence is defective or insufficient, and/or (3) that the Court was stripped of authority to grant the injunction because the original exhibit setting forth identifying info of the defendants contained a scrivener's error as to Defendant's name, which was subsequently amended (by court approval) and fixed to the Court's satisfaction. None of these is an accurate, honest, or current issue or contention in existence, which is directly provable by documentary evidence and facts – things opposing counsel cannot reasonably or realistically deny knowing before this Court. To wit: (1) counsel obtained the infringement evidence, which is proven by email and the Zoom meeting where he manipulated that evidence in an effort to obtain a dismissal voluntarily; (2) the evidence was already deemed sufficient by this Court when it granted the TRO in this matter and specifically found that there was a significant likelihood of success; Defendant's position that it has "better" evidence is nothing more than a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to decide – who it believes more – and not a proper consideration for motion practice like this; (3) the Court's authority was never stripped (no citation to fact or law was provided for this odd contention) and the amendment and corrected version of the scrivener's error were already accepted by the Court long ago. In short, not one of these three purported bases currently exists, and the issues are therefore moot and/or not ripe for review or consideration. This Motion in its entirety must be denied as there is no basis in fact in existence today which supports dissolution of the injunction.

More egregiously, the facts show that counsel Gao learned of these matters and information after filing this Motion at bar; yet he has refused to amend or withdraw the motion despite knowing he has zero foundation for asserting the contentions therein any longer. Attorneys cannot set forth knowingly inaccurate legal arguments or laws, nor can they make a bad faith argument for a change in existing law. If an attorney discovers such an error in something they have authored or filed with the Court in a pending matter, the attorney is required by the Professional Rules of Conduct to amend or withdraw same. Mr. Gao has persisted in violating these professional rules and shows no intention of stopping anytime soon. In short, this motion must be denied for its chaotic, disorganize, unclear, and incoherent procedural basis – which frankly, does not exist in any capacity and thus warrants no consideration.

1. Defendant's Motion is Substantively Defective.

Legally, Defendant fails to set forth any legal authority which is applicable to the case at bar – particularly here, where the "facts" originally set forth have either been disproven or refuted by accurate, verifiable evidence or information which Attorney Gao unquestionably learned at some point before or immediately after filing this motion. He has therefore disabused himself of the obligation he has to amend, withdraw, or correct his motion, and has not done so. The law he originally included in this brief does not apply to the facts in existence today, and is therefore a devastating substantive defect which justifies total defeat of the motion in its entirety. Even more, the case law that is cited does not warrant argument in response or further research, as it is wholly inapposite on the facts.

As referenced supra, Plaintiff further fails to set forth any applicable legal authority with the appropriate standard of review, test, factors to be considered, definitions, or requirements of a preliminary injunction or the basis for dissolving same. Because there is no ability to apply any facts – regardless of how demonstrably incorrect those facts are – to any legal standard, this motion must be denied on grounds of the legally substantive failures.

Even if Defendant had set forth any legal authority with the standard or test applicable to a preliminary injunction or dissolution of same, he would certainly fail here due to the defective, inaccurate, and baseless "facts" outlined in Defendant's motion. Namely, Defendant argues that the factual bases for dissolving this injunction are the inclusion of a scrivener's error in the original exhibit filed which identified under seal the Schedule A Defendants; there is no evidence of infringement in this case; and that the evidence of infringement that does exist was insufficient or unreliable for purposes of granting the preliminary injunction in the first place. As mentioned, none of these contentions is made in good faith, and have no support in evidence or reality. While these contentions may have originally been founded by counsel upon sheer instinct, they have been subsequently disproven to his direct and personal knowledge, and he has failed to incorporate that dispositive information in his brief, any amendments thereto, or a withdrawal of the motion because of the discovery of same.

Plaintiff's first contention is that the original exhibit filed with the Complaint here, which outlined and identified the Schedule A Defendants being sued under seal, had a scrivener's error identifying the Defendant, Funlingo, as "Walmart." Despite being a very obvious typographical error to even the layperson, there are several critical factors which counsel intentionally omitted from his briefing and dispose of his purported concerns: (1) he immediately noticed and brought this to Plaintiff's counsel's attention via email on February 13, 2025, in which he also sought to confirm whether his client was an intended defendant; (2) Plaintiff's counsel immediately responded to the email that same day and confirmed this was a typographical error and would be amended immediately, and that Funlingo was in fact the intended defendant party; (3) Plaintiff amended, and the Court accepted, the exhibit to correct this scrivener's error on that day; (4) the Court granted the preliminary injunction without reference to this scrivener's error at all, eradicating any theoretical concern that the Court somehow would have denied the motion in any way *because* of the typo, let alone after and upon acceptance of the correction; (5) Attorney Gao has known these facts since they occurred on the dates above, due to being copied on emails and e-notifications, and has intentionally omitted that dispositive fact in bad faith from his brief, seemingly in an effort to feign innocence and/or insinuate that the docket still reflects the typo in the most recent version of that filing, and thus invalidate the preliminary injunction for a typo existing in the docket. Defendant to date has failed to acknowledge its knowledge of these facts or its understanding that this is dispositive of its already-weak argument which counsel can do by simply amending or withdrawing its motion; alas, he has chosen to do neither, and is therefore upholding a knowingly false statement to this Court in bad faith and in contravention of the Professional Rules of Conduct. Because Defendant's first contention regarding the scrivener's error is nonsensical, was rendered moot by its eradication on the docket, and has no legal basis or rationale which supports dissolving an injunction, the Court should disregard and strike it from consideration entirely in ruling on the motion.

The second argument Defendant sets forth – which is curious and rather bold, as it is directly and easily disproven by evidence and counsel's conduct, emails, and statements – is that there is no evidence of infringement ***<u>at all</u>*** which as a result fails to satisfy an essential requirement of the preliminary injunction. This too fails for similar reasons as the prior contention. First, although counsel originally made this argument **<u>before ever seeing any unsealed exhibits filed in this case,</u>** he subsequently obtained unsealed exhibits which clearly included that evidence and failed to advise this Court of same in his Motion. He is intentionally continuing this farce rather than correcting himself by amendment or withdrawal and should be sanctioned for this bad faith conduct.

On February 26, 2025, he demanded that Plaintiff provide him with a copy of all evidence (which is neither obligated nor ripe for production at that early stage). Notably, because counsel did not seem to understand the local rules, I expressly advised him he could file a one-page motion to obtain an unsealed copy of the exhibits – including that evidence of infringement – directly from the Court. This would have been far quicker, less expensive, and more official than repeatedly demanding that I personally email that to him, which I explained as well. Notably, by the time of the attorney's Zoom conference the next day on February 27, 2025, Defendant had obtained a copy of the infringement evidence as he shared his screen and manipulated and utilized that exhibit during the conversation extensively. Despite my express instructions of the process to simply obtain unsealed versions of whatever he needed from the Court, counsel waited until March 7, 2025 to instead file this motion at bar, which is set for hearing at a later date. Counsel is therefore unquestionably making a bad faith argument by failing to note in his brief that he learned there was and physically had a copy of the infringement evidence back on February 27, 2025.

In fact, I directly and expressly advised counsel on March 6, 2025 – the day before he filed this baseless motion – that I had found *additional*, even more convincing evidence of infringement as to his client in response to my investigation of his manipulation of the original infringement evidence during the Zoom conference he forced me to participate in. So not only was he aware of the basis of original evidence of infringement existing which justified the TRO and subsequent PI, he also knew I had found additional evidence of infringement thanks to him, and which I advised him was more than sufficient for us to proceed against Funlingo.

Even if counsel disbelieved me, that is not a proper basis for him to state to this Court and warrant in writing, that "upon information and belief" that no such evidence exists at all in the Complaint and Exhibits originally filed. This legal term of art is abused and mutilated and misrepresented by counsel's use of it in the motion and must not be permitted – a feeling or gut instinct based on nothing more is not sufficient to warrant that you know something "upon information and belief" as Mr. Gao does in his Declaration in Defendant's Exhibit A to the motion.

Most pointedly, the Court granted a TRO in this case based upon the infringement evidence attached as an exhibit under seal with the Complaint. The TRO standard, which is notoriously more stringent and demanding that that for a preliminary injunction, was deemed by this Court to have been satisfied by this evidence of infringement, which the Court expressly obtained, reviewed, considered, and decided met the requirements to grant a TRO. It therefore follows logically that the Court had more than enough evidence of infringement to grant the lesser standard set for seeking a preliminary injunction, which it also granted.

The Court determined based its ultimate decision to grant the injunctive relief on ***this*** evidence of infringement – the same which opposing counsel in his professional opinion deems insufficient and unfit to justify granting same. As the Court determined, this evidence was sufficient not only to grant a TRO and PI, but also to demonstrate a significant likelihood of Plaintiff succeeding on the merits pursuant to the applicable legal test and factors to consider. For Defendant to later by this motion argue anything otherwise is, without question, a disrespect of this Court's authority and a public denouncement of the advisability of the Court's findings, something that the Court acutely had the preparation to make when it was one of only two entities able to see the full extent of the sealed evidence of infringement in the case while and before making that determination, and such conduct by Defendant and counsel is beyond inappropriate and sanctionable for reasons abound.

Counsel's bad faith in respect to this second contention is most infuriating because of his acts in utilizing that evidence during our February 27, 2025 Zoom conference and manipulating and utilizing a completely unredacted copy of same for those purposes in my view while sharing his screen. It does not follow logically or rationally to assert that this evidence does not exist in a motion which he filed several weeks ***after*** that conference. This behavior must not go unnoted.

The third and final contention Plaintiff could infer from Defendant's motion is that the evidence of infringement (which didn't exist, in counsel's prior argument) was insufficient to justify granting the PI. There is no argument, basis, fact, email, or other reason cited for this completely fabricated opinion. Additionally, even if counsel believes this, it is a clear genuine issue of material fact for the judge or jury to weigh in hearing this case at trial. That is the very foundation of a legal dispute, which we have presented for determination here. Our evidence of infringement attached as an exhibit to the Complaint does not need to be universally unobjectionable and accepted by all. On the same level, it is not up to Defendant's counsel to unilaterally opine, deem, or disqualify an opponent's evidence merely because he thinks he has stronger evidence in opposition. By asking the Court to agree with this argument and grant the motion at bar, Defendant is essentially and clearly demanding that this Court abdicate the authority of the jury who has been tasked with deciding this dispute on all claims and damages at trial. It is improper, legally foundationless, factually devoid, and totally incoherent to argue this point as Defendant's motion does. It also harps back on the prior issue – that counsel personally disagrees with the Court's prior decision finding that this evidence is sufficient to grant an injunction and significantly likely to support success for Plaintiff on the merits. Anything other than that is solely opinion – which is not a factor for any purposes here.

Specifically, counsel explained that he was able to manipulate the infringement evidence (URLs to the web pages selling products and documenting the infringement evidence) by editing portions of the URL but allowing them to continue to take you to the website. While this is a little-known but neat trick, it does not invalidate the fact of infringement; it is not the only evidence of that infringement; and it does not merit the abdication of a fact finder simply because counsel personally doesn't find it very compelling evidence against his client. Additionally, undersigned counsel expressly advised Defendant's counsel of same by email on March 6, 2025 the day before he filed this motion. Again, as is thematic for Mr. Gao, he has failed to disclose, amend, or withdraw this motion in an attempt to hide the facts from this Court.

It has now been nearly 28 days since Defendant learned of all facts pertinent to the above three arguments which directly undermine, refute, and contradict those statements, and which entirely dispose of the arguments set forth in this motion at bar. Counsel has chosen for 28 days not to address his bad faith legal statements and arguments or correct his intentional misstatements of fact for this Court, which he can do by amendment or withdrawal, and merely admitting he learned new info. The active and knowing decision not to do this is a professional obligation and a lie by a sworn office of this court.

Defendant's last-ditch effort is to accuse Plaintiff and counsel of unclean hands. Without delving too much into this extremely inappropriate argument, it is notable that it necessarily encompasses the Court and its prior decisions granting the TRO and PI, and is thus an unwise contention to make – in addition to being professional misconduct and inappropriate in all regards. The Court has the authority to make these determinations and to view, comprehend, and weigh evidence; the Defendant has no standing or ability to challenge that authority, especially on the brief submitted. Moreover, arguing that a simple scrivener's error – which we disclosed to counsel, corrected immediately, with permission and to satisfaction of this Court – constitutes anything to do with the unclean hands doctrine is completely bizarre and founded in hopes and wishes, not legal analysis.

In sum, the three main contentions set forth by Defendant's motion are absolutely baseless, knowingly false, inappropriately and intentionally set forth in bad faith, and in the best of circumstances fail to set up any legal foundation for the dissolution of a preliminary injunction such as the one granted in the case at bar, by a fully informed Court, with full review of the appropriate evidence and law, and with plenty of consideration given to all pertinent factors. If Defendant had any factual or legal basis or rationale to justify this demand, it would have set it forth by this motion, which it plainly fails to do. The inapposite case law cited bears no discussion, as the facts in the brief are the opposite – completely provable misrepresentations and lies. Accordingly, because not a single fact has been presented in this motion, the case law cited bears absolutely no consideration or waste of further time and resources in analyzing, as the entirety of the motion is theoretical and hypothetical at best.

B. Defendant's Motion for Expedited Discovery Should be Denied

Incomprehensibly, Defendant also moves for expedited discovery, which is such an obviously wasteful and baseless demand at this stage of proceedings in light of the facts which are again, omitted from the brief. First, Defendant demanded I provide him evidence and documents on February 26, 2025 without stating a single legal basis or reason. I responded via email – and repeated during our Zoom conference the very next day – inquiring as to this legal basis or rationale for such demand when counsel had just appeared in the case and had failed to even tender regular discovery requests or file a motion to obtain unsealed documents with the court (as is routine and specifically provided for pursuant to local rule). Defendant's counsel admitted during the Zoom conference that he had no such citation or basis to point to, and he was merely making the request out of courtesy. Accordingly, I advised I'd consider it but needed to talk later.

The next day, counsel initiated an overly aggressive and irrational attack against Plaintiff and undersigned counsel in which he sent repetitive, demanding, harassing, and threatening emails; falsely complained of purported professional conduct of undersigned counsel which was unacceptable (such as taking more than one hour to respond to a non-urgent email on a given weekday); threatening to file a motion for sanctions; and overall behaving erratically. Notably, counsel never once left a voicemail for undersigned counsel as claimed in his brief, nor did he raise any issues with counsel while in person with each other at the initial court appearance on March 7, 2025. At that stage, given the nature of counsel's conduct, Plaintiff felt no urge to engage in any acts of courtesy out of the kindness of her heart; rather, she both advised Defendant that she would not comply with this demand so he was aware of her position, and instructed him to simply serve written discovery pursuant to Rule 26. This last correspondence was sent March 6, 2025.

Rather than follow this simple and wise advice, Defendant filed the present motion on March 7, 2025, over three weeks after counsel advised defendant how to obtain those documents from the Court. As of today, Defendant still has not served any regular written discovery requests pursuant to Rule 26 on Plaintiff. Pursuant to Rule 26, discovery responses are due within 28 days. By the time this motion for expedited discovery is decided at the hearing, over 60 days will have passed and ironically, the motion might ultimately be denied, placing Defendant right at the beginning of this arduous process.

Defendant's motion is therefore tendered in illogical fashion, set forth by counsel in bad faith or out of negligently or reckless disregard for the law and applicable rules which he is obligated to know, and utterly undermines his argument for expediency, which is the sole element required to grant such a motion, as he has chosen to sit by and wait over 60 days and seek this motion rather than simply serve regular written discovery request on February 13, 2025 when he appeared, as was suggested. Had he done so, the 28 days would expire on March 13, 2025, and he would already have the discovery responses in advance of the hearing on this motion. The self-professed "urgency" to justify a request of this Court to compel "expedited" discovery is totally and clearly absent here, and because Defendant cannot establish same, this motion must be denied.

C. Sanctions Are Appropriate and Necessary for Defendant and Counsel's Bad Faith Conduct, Intentional Misrepresentation, Fraudulent Misstatements/Omissions of Critical Facts from the Record, and Deliberately Intimidating and Threatening Conduct Intended to Coerce Conduct from Opposing Counsel.

Although an attorney has a duty to competently and fervently represent a client in good faith and with the best intentions, he must do so in compliance with and observance of all applicable law or a good faith effort to change the law. The attorney must not, however, engage in knowing misconduct, set forth legally inaccurate or factually baseless statements or arguments, or represent or omit critical information to the Court when same is provably false and directly within the knowledge of the attorney or its party. Even where an attorney subsequently learns of facts or info which wholly contradict or invalidate a writing which the attorney previously filed with the Court but remains pending, the attorney is obligated to amend or withdraw that filing to correct the portions in violation and explain the new discovery justifying the basis for such amendment or withdrawal. Here, Defendant and its counsel have flouted the rules in a public display of disregard for its opponent in litigation and this Court of law. This conduct is sure to continue absent direct and immediate redress by this Court. The Plaintiff therefore seeks relief to include denial of all motions/requests by Defendant in said motions at bar, as well as sanctions of Funlingo as a party and defense counsel Zheng Gao individually for participating in, directing, and controlling this bad faith conduct.

Plaintiff hereby moves for sanctions as a result of the bad faith conduct and arguments set forth in the Defendant's Motion at bar, which include, but are not limited to:

- Intentionally misrepresenting the exhibits, case history, and docket to this Court;
- Intentionally omitting or lying about facts which are harmful to Defendant's argument which are dispositive of the motion in its entirety or in part;

- Fraudulently manipulating evidence in an effort to induce a voluntary dismissal on counsel's representations alone and purported good faith intentions, which were subsequently disproved and discovered;
- Deliiberately misstating the exhibits and evidence attached to Defendant's motion with respect to undersigned counsel's actions, including implications and phrasing which assigns blame, delay, lack of diligence, and ignorance of professional duties to her, and overall suggests improper behavior which demonstrably did not occur – as can be seen by merely reading the actual exhibits referenced;
- Attempting to intimidate and threaten counsel with sanctions for no legal basis or reason simply because of a desire to be given advanced copies of investigative mateirals by an opponent instead of issuing proper discovery requests; and
- Tendering a completely defective and baseless motion which is devoid of fact or law and which has forced the expense, cost, attorney fees, and delay of case to Plaintiff's harm and prejudice, and which must be compensated as this was done intentionally and with the purposes of achieving that result; and
- Most confusingly and obviously, defense counsel's refusal to admit that he knows or learned of dispositive information and facts directly on point for this motion at bar which cut against his arguments and requests for relief, are entirely dispositive of the claims and relief sought therein, and reflect poorly on his intentional misrepresentation that he made factual contentions "upon information and belief" as set forth in his declaration, which was false and entirely self-serving.

All other extraneous elements should be totally disregarded and stricken by the Court for purposes of the underlying motion, but are absolutely appropriate for its consideration in rendering sanctions, which Plaintiff respectfully seeks. Sanctions are particularly appropriate here, where counsel has clearly evinced his total absence of humility and disrespect for his professional colleagues as well as this Court of law. His actions to date are certain to persist and must be expressly and heavily punished now, at the outset of litigation, before this case devolves any further.

DATED: April 4, 2025

Bayramoglu Law Offices, LLC

By: */s/ Kathleen Freeman*
Kathleen Freeman (Bar No. 6325627)
BAYRAMOGLU LAW OFFICES LLC
233 S Wacker Drive, 44th Floor, #57
Chicago, IL 60606
Tel: (702) 462-5973 | Fax: (702) 553-3404
Kathleen@bayramoglu-legal.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 4th day of April 2025, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the clerk of the court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, using the electronic case filing system of the court. The electronic case filing system sent a "Notice of Electronic Filing" to the attorneys of record who have consented in writing to accept this Notice as service of this document by electronic means.

By: *_/s/ Kathleen Freeman_*
Kathleen Freeman (Bar No. 6325627)
BAYRAMOGLU LAW OFFICES LLC
233 S Wacker Drive, 44th Floor, #57
Chicago, IL 60606
Tel: (702) 462-5973 | Fax: (702) 553-3404
Kathleen@bayramoglu-legal.com
Attorney for Plaintiff